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NOTES ON INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
The Beginnings of International Government.* Definition and
Implications of International Government. In the preface to her
Study of International Government, published about 1924, Dr. Jessie
Wallace Hughan, an unmistakably American author, thus defines her
topic: "'International' carries two simple and related meanings:
pertaining to two or more nations, and concerning different nations
in common. 'Government' signifies the exercise of authority in the
administration of the affairs of a state, community, or society. 'In-
ternational government,' therefore, is the exercise of authority in the
administration of the affairs of two or more nations.''
This is simple, short, and snappy, as are many American phrases
coined for a people who are daily taught to think in headlines, to
read in subways, and to worship what a clever author has called
"the ideal of acceleration." As a sincere admirer of American busi-
ness methods, and as the grateful owner of an American motor-car,
I should be the last to sneer at the process of thinking in head-
lines and reading in subways, or at the cult of acceleration. But if
there is one thing which cannot be profitably done in a hurry, it
is abstract intellectual analysis. Let us therefore, with as much old-
world leisure as the distinctly new-world estival atmosphere of Geneva
will permit, consider these concepts a little more closely. The defini-
tions we will arrive at will doubtless be less simple, short, and snappy
than the above. Possibly, however, by positing while not pretending
to solve what is assuredly a complicated problem, they may no less use-
fully contribute to its elucidation.
If, discarding all dictionaries and disregarding all academic dis-
cussion, we analyze the notion of government in the light of his-
torical experience, I believe we shall agree that it contains two essen-
tial elements, without either of which there can be no true govern-
ment. The first of these is authority, that is, the competence and
ability to command and to be obeyed in the political sphere. The sec-
ond is order, that is, a certain scheme, or method, or plan, to which
the governed are made to conform.
* An address delivered before the Geneva Institute of International Belations,
July 28, 1930.
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1 0 0 2 THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW
There may be authority without government, as in the ease of
the purely arbitrary rule of a brigand chief or a political boss. And
there may be order without government, as in the elaboration of a
treatise on politics. But where there is both order and authority,
political authority exercised to enforce some kind of political order,
then there is bound to be government. The authority may be dic-
tatorial, as in Fascist Italy, or liberal, as in classical Athens; the
order may consist in a multitude of hard and fast rules, as in the
Soviet Union of the five-year plan; or it may consist in a few general
principles as in "muddling through" Great Britain. Whenever and
wherever is authority and order, then and there is government.
Now what about international government? By that term we may
mean—and it is well not to confuse the different meanings—either
government by two or more nations or the government of two or
more nations.
Examples of international government in the first sense are the
rather unfortunate historical instances of so-called condominia; also
the present administration of the Saar Basin. In the latter case, a
territory has been governed for the last ten years by an international
commission appointed by the Council of the League of Nations, an
international body. If the mandated areas were administered by the
League of Nations, as was at first proposed, and not by mandatory
powers on behalf of the League, as is actually the case, we should
have another example of international government in the first sense.
As a matter of fact, the mandate system does not offer an example of
international government. This is so, not because the League of
Nations is not an international body, but because the powers it exer-
cises over mandated territories are not those of government, but only
of supervision.
Examples of international government in the second sense, that is
to say, the government of an international community, are, for very sig-
nificant reasons, much more difficult to find. Monarchical rulers of
two or more countries bound together in a personal union, such as
the kings of England and Hanover before 1837 or the kings of Sweden
and Norway before 1905, might have been said to exercise inter-
national government. As a matter of fact, they did not. Likewise,
during peace negotiations, the power or powers victorious over a
coalition of allies, enforcing its or their will simultaneously on two
or more defeated enemies, might be spoken of as temporary inter-
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NOTES ON INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 1003
national rulers. I do not know whether the term has ever been used
in that connection.
The Peace Conference of Paris in 1919, to be sure, is sometimes
given as an example of international government. That is so, how-
ever, rather because the victorious governors formed an international
group than because they laid down the law for the international
community of the defeated. Nor is the government of a confederacy
or of a federal state, such as the British Empire or the United States
of America or the Swiss republic, ever spoken of as an international
government.
If we pass in review all historical examples of government in which
several political units were subjected to a common rule, we shall
never, I believe, discover a single example of what any of us would
be tempted to call international government. And still it was with
a view to speaking of the states assembled in the League of Nations
that I was asked to discuss the beginnings of international govern-
ment. What is the explanation of the riddle ? It is very simple—or,
rather, there is no riddle at all, but only the loose expression of a
vague idea.
Some of us are apt to think of the League as an example of inter-
national government, less because the members may seem to form
a community of governed than because they may seem to form a com-
munity of governors. They are thought of as governing, not as being
governed—of governing one another, it is true, but not as being gov-
erned one by another.
If one were to suggest in public that a state member of the League
of Nations was being governed by any one but its own exclusive
self, he would be evicted from office if an official, defeated at elec-
tions if a candidate, and possibly censured even if only a mere
professor. In my opinion, such treatment, although excessive, would,
in the case of the professor at least, not be unreasonable. As we
shall see presently, it is not true to say today, although I sincerely
hope that it may become less untrue at a not too far distant date,
that a state member of the League of Nations is governed by the inter-
national body of which it is a part.
It, of course, follows that if members of the League are not really
governed from Geneva, they together, as a League of Nations, govern
no one, except as we have seen, the Saar Basin, and that only as a
temporary expedient. If, therefore, the League is not engaged in
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1 0 0 4 THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW
international government in the second sense of the term, it cannot
truly be said to be engaged in it in the first. If no state and no group
of states consents to be the object of international government, the
community of states forming the League can clearly not be an agency
of international government.
Indeed, if we wished to sacrifice current linguistic usage to logically
precise phraseology, we could show that there is a contradiction in-
volved in the term "international government." Government, as
we have seen, is authority to enforce order. A nation or a state is,
according to orthodox theory, a sovereign unit. Even if we discard
the classical doctrine of absolute sovereignty as an ideal, we must
admit that in ordinary parlance a nation or a state ceases to be a
nation or a state when it submits to a superior authority. New York
is not a state in the international sense, in spite of its size, wealth,
and population, which in Europe would almost entitle it to rank as
a great power. Nor do New Yorkers constitute a nation. Why not?
Simply because, submitting as they do, in theory at least, to the will
of the federal government, they are not politically independent.
Now if a nation forfeits its status as a nation by bowing to the
authority of a superior government, then clearly international gov-
ernment is a misnomer. Either there is government—and then it
is not international, but supernational, or rather world government—
or there are independent nations—and then there is no international
government, although of course there may be international coopera-
tion or organization.
The term international government is therefore ambiguous or over-
ambitious. It is ambiguous if used to describe a hypothetical world
government, as ambiguous as the term interstate government would
be to describe the constitutional system of the United States or the
term intercantonal government to describe that of Switzerland. And
it is over-ambitious if used to describe what goes on in Geneva, for,
as we shall see, that is hardly government at all.
Now this is not a mere quibble, as it may seem to some at first
glance. All those who expect the League of Nations effectively to
prevent war, to promote disarmament, and to reorganize the world
in accordance with the best economic interests of the inhabitants of
the globe more or less consciously think of it as a super-state or a
world government. When they do so consciously and intelligently,
they may be bold enough to admit it, as did Mr. Oscar Crosby in his
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NOTES ON INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 1005
book entitled International War: its Causes and its Cure (1919), or,
more recently, Mr. H. G. Wells in several of his writings. But when
they do so unconsciously, as vast numbers of people all over the world
do today, they are apt to allude to the League as an institution of inter-
national government—in that case a convenient term for the muddle-
headed and a phrase adequate only for the expression of a confused
idea.
My insistence on this point is not due to any academic verbal frenzy,
such as we professors sometimes seem to indulge in with the delight
of perversity. My wish is only to call attention to the dangers of
a term which, unless clearly understood, necessarily promotes loose
thinking on what is to my mind one of the fundamental questions
in international relations.
In order to soothe those whom this pedantic discussion may have
irritated and to show that my views, even if deemed startlingly
heterodox, are not confined to academic circles, let me quote from the
illustrious author of the Outline of History. In this statement, drawn
from an article entitled Delusions about World Peace,1 the main
point I have sought to make is particularly stressed. It is indeed
stressed with an emphasis that would seem impertinent and that
would be exaggerated on the part of anyone not an intellectual
genius, legitimately enjoying the novelist's privilege of over-statement.
"One real test of pacifist sincerity," says Mr. Wells, "is to be found
in the pose toward national independence. To anyone who will sit
down for five minutes and face the facts squarely it must be evident
that the organization of world peace, so that war will be impossible
and disarmament secure, involves some sort of federal authority in
the world's affairs. At some point there must be the certainty of a
decision upon all disputes of races and peoples and nations that would
otherwise necessitate war. And this authority must clearly have the
power to enforce its decisions. Whatever navies and armies survive,
other than police forces for local and definite ends, must be under
the control of this central authority. It may be a committee of na-
tional representatives or what you will, but central authority there
must be. Pax Mundi, like the Pax Eomana or the Pax Britannica,
must be the only sovereign power within its realm. If you are not
prepared to see your own country and your own flag so far sub-
' H . G. Wells, The Way the World is Going (London, 1928), pp. 149-150.
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1006 THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW
ordinated to collective control, whatever protestations of peaceful in-
tentions you make are either made unintelligently or else in bad faith.
Your country cannot be both independent and restricted. Either you
are for Cosmopolis or you are for war."
Does International Government thus Defined and Understood Exist
Today t We have seen that, speaking strictly, international govern-
ment is a misnomer. Taking it, however, in the sense of supernational
or world government, let us see whether any beginnings of it may
be said to be apparent on the international horizon today. Let us
examine first whether there is any order in the relations between
states, and then whether there is any authority competent to enforce
that order.
It has become the fashion amongst students of international affairs
to speak of our contemporary world as offering the spectacle of in-
ternational anarchy. This significant phrase should not blind us to
the fact that there is today much more order in international rela-
tions than there ever has been in the past, that not only has peace
come to be regarded as the normal condition of international relations,
but by far the largest number of political, economic, and intellectual
dealings between different states and their nationals take place with-
out injustice or friction. In case of difficulty, national laws or inter-
national treaties recognized as valid by both parties and adminis-
tered by unchallenged national or international tribunals provide a
peaceful and orderly means of settlement.
Unfortunately, there remain several possibilities of disagreement,
and among them some of the gravest sources of conflict. I shall not
attempt to enumerate all the classes of cases in private international
law where no one guiding principle of solution is adopted by all
states, and which are therefore not susceptible of a settlement legally
satisfactory to all parties. Such cases, numerous and troublesome
though they be as occasions of disputes between individuals and as
symptoms of international disorder, are not the most serious. They
are seldom more than pretexts for interstate conflicts. Moreover, their
number tends to diminish with the not too difficult progress of private
international law. The real subsisting international anarchy lies else-
where. It is to be found in the fundamentally unsatisfactory and un-
settled relations between the states themselves, much more than in those
between the respective citizens.
Briefly to circumscribe this anarchy, we may say that it springs
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NOTES ON INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 1007
from three distinct sources. One is the still persistent reluctance
of most states to agree once and for all to accept the jurisdiction
of an independent tribunal and to abide by its decision whenever
there is a generally recognized law or legal principle applicable to
the case in dispute. The recent very noticeable progress of so-called
compulsory arbitration tends to narrow this hotbed of disorder. But
it will subsist until all states have, without any reservation and
without any time limit, accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of some
international court of justice. Up to date (July 28, 1930), 28 signa-
tories, out of some 70 so-called sovereign states, have finally accepted
the jurisdiction of the Permanent Court of International Justice,
under Paragraph 2 of Article 36 of its Statutes. But among them
there are as yet only two great powers, Germany and Great Britain;
and in no case has this step been taken without some often important
reservations or conditions.
We are here, however, in the presence of a rapidly spreading system
of legal international order. It is to be hoped and, I think one may
add without undue optimism, expected, that our generation or the
next may see the completion of this very happy evolution. It is
coming to be more and more generally recognized that, as M. Briand
had the courage to say on the platform of the Ninth Assembly, "there
is no dishonor even for a Great Power to go to The Hague and to
return disappointed." As Professor Laski has rightly said,2 "To
suggest that a nation is humiliated by being proved in error is as wise
as to suggest that trial by battle is likely to result in justice. A
power, indeed, which urges its prestige as a means of evading inter-
national jurisdiction is fairly certain to be wrong."
The progress of compulsory arbitration, important as it is, is, how-
ever, far from tending to the establishment of a complete international
order. The second element of anarchy in the present situation is the
absence of any pacific means of modifying international law without
the consent of all states concerned. Existing international order may
be fundamentally unfair on certain important points, and it is bound,
unless altered, to become more and more so in course of time. Cer-
tain frontiers may be indefensible on grounds of justice. The very
unequal distribution of colonial possessions and natural resources may
be rightly resented, not only by those who have been despoiled, but
1
 Op. tit., p. 167.
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1008 THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW
even by the large majority of mankind. Certain limitations of inde-
pendence may seem unjustified, not only to people struggling for
emancipation, but even to the disinterested onlooker.
No matter how revolting to the general sense of justice, and no
matter how threatening to peace, international law, even if adminis-
tered by a court of justice whose jurisdiction would be universally
recognized, affords no redress in such cases. Diplomatic negotiations,
mediation by the Council of the League, consultation by ad hoc com-
missions, international conferences, and discussions before the As-
sembly under Article 19 of the Covenant may achieve something, but
only if the beneficiary of an unfair advantage consents to relinquish
it. If he does not, the international community is helpless. It is
in the position of a state whose constitution refused to allow for
legislation by majority and contained no provisions permitting its own
amendment. As Professor Brierly said in the course of a remarkable
lecture on "The Function of Law in International Relations" two
years ago, ' ' The problem of the peaceful incorporation of changes into
an existing order is the supreme problem of statesmanship, national
or international. Whenever it is not frankly faced and solved, revo-
lution in the national, and war in the international, field will always
in the long run burst the fragile dams of legal formulas by which
we vainly try to stabilize a changing world. The paradox of all law
is that it cannot keep its vitality unless there exist legal means of
overriding legal rights in a proper case, but if we believe that the
law exists for men and not men for the law, it is right that this should
be so. Within a well-ordered state the pressure for change is more
or less successfully canalized by a legislature, which can weigh de-
mands and judge what changes are just, and when. In the inter-
national sphere the problem has not yet found its solution.' '3
The third source of international anarchy lies in the fact that
many phenomena of international importance are at present still be-
yond the orbit of international law. Whereas in the preceding case
an international tribunal, if consulted, is bound to render a decision
contrary to the dictates of justice, because the law itself is unjust,
here it cannot even be consulted, or is bound, if consulted, to remain
mute, because there is no law for it to apply.
A state may strangle its neighbors by means of its tariff policy. It
s I n Problems of Peace (3rd ser., London, 1929), p. 297.
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NOTES ON INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 1009
may oppress its own nationals or exclude all foreigners from the en-
joyment of its natural resources. It may make the most elaborate and
threatening preparations for a war of aggression, and thereby oblige
its neighbors either to enter into a ruinous race of competitive arma-
ments or to submit to any one of those forms of pressure and bullying
to which disproportionate force has so often given rise in the past.
The world of sovereign states as at present organized is equally help-
less in the presence of such policies, which, while not illegal, are
as disruptive of international order as they are threatening to peace.
To quote Professor Laski once more: " . . . the notion, of an inde-
pendent sovereign state is, on the international side, fatal to the well-
being of humanity. The way in which a state should live its life in
relation to other states is clearly not a matter in which that state
is entitled to be sole judge. That way lies the long avenue of dis-
astrous warfare of which the rape of Belgium is the supreme moral
result in modern times. The common life of states is a matter for
common agreement between states. International government is, there-
fore, axiomatic in any plan for international well-being. But inter-
national government implies the organized subordination of states
to an authority in which each may have a voice, but in which, also,
that voice is never the self-determined source of decision. . . . Eng-
land ought not to settle what armaments she needs, the tariffs she will
erect, the immigrants she will permit to enter. These matters affect
the common life of peoples; and they imply a unified world organized
to administer them."4
So much for international order, which, as we have seen, is the
rule, and international disorder, which, while exceptional, is still, and
I may add increasingly, dangerous in a constantly shrinking world.
Now how about authority—that authority without which even complete
and perfect order is not government? Without the authority to im-
pose and to enforce order, there is not only no government, but there
can likewise be no security. This is, in fact, the only justification
for government on the international, as on the national, plan. If na-
tions or individuals could be relied upon willingly to accept and
faithfully to observe, as self-imposed law, all the suggestions of a
duly qualified advisory agency, then government, national or inter-
national, would be superfluous, as it is necessarily always more or less
4
 Op. cit., p. 65.
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1010 THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW
oppressive. No government! Such is, therefore, the plea of the
thoroughgoing anarchist. He is an anarchist, not because he favors
disorder, but because he believes in the possibility of spontaneous order.
In the national field, however, the anarchist is looked upon as a dan-
gerous Utopian, and by no one with as much suspicion and intolerance
as by those conservatively-minded members of the community for
whom the dangerous Utopian on the international plan is he who most
insistently clamors for some form of supernational government.
Now, supernational government and absolute national sovereignty
are, as we have seen, logically and historically incompatible. The
authors of the Covenant of the League of Nations, wisely recognizing
that any frontal attack on the sacrosanct citadel of national sover-
eignty was doomed to failure and would only, if attempted, spell dis-
astrous defeat for their whole undertaking, deliberately refrained
from it. Who could blame them when, timid and cautious as they
made the document, it still proved too revolutionary for the people
of the United States and too threatening for senators' sense of na-
tional independence? Who could blame them when the first Assem-
blies, interpreting Articles 10 and 16, went still further in the desire
to limit the authority of the League and to reduce the obligations
of its members? Who could blame them when, later on, the Draft
Treaty of Mutual Guaranty in 1923 and the Protocol of Geneva in
1924, which were conscious reactions against this tendency, proved un-
acceptable to all non-European states? And who could blame them
today in Europe when, more than ten years later, even M. Briand,
perhaps the boldest internationalist on the front of the political
scene, has felt bound in his famous Memorandum to insist on his fer-
vent respect for the absolute sovereignty of the states between whom
he proposes to establish a federal bond?
The League, therefore, having no authority over its members, be-
cause its members will accept no binding obligations toward it, is not
an institution of government. It is, if you please, a government by
persuasion. But that is a literary phrase without any scientific mean-
ing. Government by persuasion is persuasion and not government.
But, it may be asked, are there not at least some beginnings of gov-
ernment in the League ? Are there no moral forces at work in Geneva
which, even without governmental authority, tend to guide the wills
of the sovereign states toward some common goal? Taken in this
sense, I think we may reply in the affirmative. Although much has
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NOTES ON INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 1011
been said about the famous "spirit of Geneva" which may sound well
in a political speech or in a post-prandial address, but which would
be out of place in a scientific lecture, there is no doubt in my mind
that there is here an environmental influence which does contribute
to promote international cooperation. It is not, as some of my fellow-
citizens like to believe, the influence of the historic city-republic of
Geneva. It is rather the result and the expression of an international
esprit de corps which may well prove to be the embryo of a future
world patriotism.
When leading statesmen of fourteen countries meet three or four
times a year as members of the Council in Geneva, or when leading
statesmen of some fifty nations spend a month together as members
of the Assembly, discussing and trying to solve problems of common
concern in a spirit of conciliation and friendliness, they become some-
thing more than mere plenipotentiaries of their respective sovereign
states. A new loyalty toward the League, or even toward mankind as
a whole, is sometimes discernible, which makes for mutual conces-
sions and thereby for something in the nature of a common policy.
The best proof of the reality of this intangible and imponderable
spirit is to be found in the fact that, when these statesmen return
to face their respective national parliaments, they are invariably ac-
cused by their respective nationalists of having succumbed to the
diplomacy of their sly and wicked foreign antagonists.
Neither the Assembly nor the Council governs the world, or the
League of Nations, or any of its members. But they do undoubtedly
exercise a certain influence on the shaping of national policies. In
this sense, beginnings of international government may be detected in
Geneva. What there is, really and obviously, on the other hand, is
international cooperation and international organization.
In the evolution which seems to carry the nations of the world
from absolute isolation to real federation, three successive phases may
be distinguished. The first is that of free and spontaneous coopera-
tion. This stage started with the beginnings of intercourse and diplo-
macy and progressed very rapidly with the advance of population,
wealth, industrial science, and trade. Already before the World
War it had reached such development and intensity that in various
technical fields it had given rise to international unions, just as in
the political field it has since the most ancient times led to defensive
and offensive alliances of different types.
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1012 THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW
The second phase in this evolution may be described as that of
voluntary and self-imposed organization, of which such unions and
alliances were the prototypes, and of which the League of Nations is
the most recent expression and the most perfect instrument. In this
phase, the source of all power and of all decision still remains with
the individual nations. But they agree, under certain conditions, for
a certain time, in certain contingencies and for certain well-defined
purposes, to conform their respective policies to certain generally ac-
cepted principles. They even go so far, in a few exceptional circum-
stances, as under Article 15, Paragraph 7, of the Covenant, or under
the Optional Clause of Article 36 of the Statute of the Court, or
under the General Act of 1929, or under various bilateral treaties,
as to bind themselves to submit to the verdict of a foreign authority.
In so far, but in so far only, international organization may be said
clearly to foreshadow the third phase of this evolution, the final phase
of world government.
In this progressive development, the states members of the League
are unequally prepared to participate, or rather are not all prepared
to go equally far. France and her Continental allies, who have every-
thing to gain and nothing to risk by the establishment of an order
of things in which present frontiers will be guaranteed by the com-
bined forces of the League, seem in some respects ready to go farthest
in the direction of world government. But when it is suggested that
there, of course, can be no such government without the power to re-
vise existing treaties, if the interests of the greater part of the com-
munity should demand such revision, even France and especially her
eastern allies become most insistent on the sacred character of their
sovereign rights.
The discontented states of the world, i.e., those against whom the
peace treaties were drawn up—the defeated Central Powers, Italy, a
disappointed victor, and China, the victim of her allies' triumphs,
assume the opposite attitude. They are for League government in
so far as League government means the possibility of redrafting the
map of the world, but vigorously opposed to it when it implies
the collective stabilization of the present conditions.
The European ex-neutrals, who are all small states, wish to
strengthen the League in its judicial functions, but are very reluctant
to endow it with more political power. They are content with inter-
national organization which, in their view, implies the general appli-
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cation of the principle of compulsory arbitration. But League gov-
ernment, which, they fear, would mean government by the Great
Powers, has no attractions, and is indeed not without its terrors. The
weakness of their position resides in the fact that, while they im-
patiently demand disarmament, they are unwilling to make the sacri-
fices of national independence which international guarantees—with-
out which there can be no general disarmament—inevitably demand.
The attitude of Great Britain in its present temper is not very differ-
ent, although it is, of course, based on other political and geographical
considerations.
The non-European states are, on the whole, still in the phase of
international cooperation. They are sometimes ready to consider a
measure of international organization, but they are always resolutely
averse to any form, of world government. Whether they belong to the
League, as Japan, the British dominions, and the smaller Latin Ameri-
can republics, or whether they participate only in its technical activi-
ties, as do the United States, Brazil, Mexico, and Argentina, their
policy is fundamentally the same. They are for cooperation, because
cooperation means enhanced prosperity. They are suspicious of or-
ganization, because organization may imply troublesome obligations.
And, with the possible exception of Japan, they are violently opposed
to world government, because world government would seem to
threaten their privileged economic position, endanger their newly won
independence, and too closely associate them with all that is objec-
tionable in the intolerable continent of Europe. For states so dis-
posed, the platonic vows of the Kellogg Pact and the pious aspirations
of disarmament discussions are the last word in the art of preventing
war.
As for Soviet Bussia, it, of course, occupies a place by itself. In the
eyes of Moscow, cooperation with capitalistic nations would be a futile
farce were it not an adventure offering some opportunities for revolu-
tionary propaganda and some possibilities of obtaining foreign credits.
International organization is meaningless and world government the
sole desirable goal, world government implying, of course, the in-
corporation of the rest of the universe in the Union of Federated
Socialist Soviet Republics.
Such, in very rough outline, is the map of the globe, as I see it,
when considered from the point of view of international relations.
Even the most enthusiastic friend of world government must admit
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that from such beginnings to that goal, "it 's a long, long way to Tip-
perary!''
Why World Government is Desirable and Why it is Still Almost
Universally Opposed. Let us, in conclusion, ask ourselves why man-
kind should appear to be blindly groping for some form of world
government and why it should still be so reluctant to advance de-
liberately in that direction.
In our sceptical age, almost all moral axioms may be, and are in
fact, questioned. Were one to ask, however, whether peace is prefer-
able to war, harmonious cooperation to hostile rivalry, and pros-
perity to poverty—in a word, life to death—even our agnostic hu-
manity would almost unanimously answer in the affirmative.
Now, without some form of supernational authority entrusted with
the duty of maintaining peace, securing disarmament, and promoting
prosperity—that is to say, the duty of governing mankind in the ex-
clusive interests of mankind—the coveted goal would appear even
theoretically inaccessible. "Either you are for Cosmopolis or you
are for war," as H. G. Wells declared in the above quoted lapidary
formula. The story of all recent and successful federations would
seem to confirm this view. "Either you are for a United States of
America, for a unified Germany, for a Swiss confederacy, for a king-
dom of Italy, or you are for war, stagnation, and poverty." Thus
spoke the American federalists of 1787, the promoters of the Ger-
man Zollverein in the first half of the nineteenth century, the Swiss
progressives in 1848, and the Italian patriots of the Risorgimento.
But why does not all civilized, pacific, and forward-looking human-
ity speak like Wells today? The reasons are obvious. In the first
place, there is as yet in the twentieth century no world patriotism
comparable in vital intensity to the American, German, Swiss, or
Italian patriotism of the eighteenth and nineteenth. The millenaries
of common aspirations, strife, and suffering which mankind has lived
through since the beginnings of time have not yet given rise to a
true and strong feeling of world solidarity. The disruptive forces
of different origin, race, tradition, language, culture, and religion
are still far more potent than the uniting forces of common experience
and common interest.
In the second place, the love of freedom and independence, perhaps
the most powerful impulse of individuals and nations, still blocks
the road to federation. Freedom and independence, the necessary con-
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ditions of self-assertion, are not only highly prized advantages but
have come to be sublimated into sacred ideals. Generations in all
countries have striven, bled, and died for the cause of freedom and
independence. Is it surprising that men today should resent the very
thought of a superstate conceived as depriving them of these blessings ?
To be sure, any well considered plan of world government should
tend to enlarge and not to limit individual freedom, and indeed also
national independence in the best sense of the term. By doing away
with war, crushing armaments, suicidal rivalry, and all the hindrances
and restrictions of national sovereignty, it should appear as an instru-
ment of human emancipation and not of oppression. It would, of
course, be, not a foreign government, but a cooperative institution,
destined to protect individual and collective rights of self-determina-
tion and not to impose any uniform system of local and national ad-
ministration. Differences of culture, language, and religion would
be treasured as necessary conditions of life and progress.
All this may be true, and indeed obvious'; but it is not yet understood
by the man in the street, be it Main Street, Wall Street, the Strand,
Under den Linden, la Rue de la Paix, or even Quai Wilson. In this
connection, I venture to suggest that the term Cosmopolis is ex-
ceptionally unfortunate as the name of a world state, since it would
seem to evoke an imposed uniformity of type much more than a peace-
fully organized and harmoniously federated diversity of local and na-
tional units.
The third main obstacle on the road to a world government results
from the very unequal stages of national development we have noted
above. If set up tomorrow, a world state would almost necessarily
imply a very unequal, and therefore unfair, distribution of benefits
and sacrifices. Some countries, and above all the United States of
America, are large, thinly settled in comparison to their natural re-
sources, and relatively secure from foreign aggression. Others, on
the contrary, especially in Europe, are small, over-populated, and
hedged in on all sides by threatening neighbors.
While the two previously mentioned obstacles, and especially the
second, should be overcome with comparative ease by education and
enlightenment, the third strikes me as insuperable for the present
and the near future. Time alone, the progressive equalization of eco-
nomic and social conditions which it seems bound to bring about,
cumulative experience of the dangers for all, and even for the most
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protected, of sovereign states, and the constantly growing realization
of the real solidarity of the most fortunate and the least fortunate
of the human family may gradually lead us all on with a more as-
sured gait toward some form of that supernational government of
which we are today witnessing the timid and halting beginnings.
Let me close with a last quotation from Professor Laski which may
serve, with some qualification, as both a summary and a conclusion:
"The implication, in a word, of modern conditions is world govern-
ment. The process, naturally enough, is immensely more complicated
than the government of a single state. The spiritual tradition of
cooperation has still to be created; the difficulty of language has to be
overcome; the application of decisions has to be agreed upon in terms
of a technique that is still largely unexplored. The only source of
comfort we possess is the increasing recognition that modern war-
fare is literally a form of suicide, and that, as a consequence, the
choice before us is between cooperation and disaster. That was the
sense which, in 1919, led the makers of the Peace of Versailles to
strive for the mitigation of its inequities by the acceptance of the
League of Nations. The latter, indeed, is the fagade of a structure
which has not yet been called into being. But it has at least this great
importance, that it constitutes an organ of reference which goes be-
yond the fiat of a given state. It is, in fact, either nothing, or else
a denial of national sovereignty in world-affairs. It is upon the basis
of that denial that we have to build.' '5
With the end of this statement, spirited and speculative as every-
thing that flows from its brilliant author's pen, I find myself unable
fully to agree. The League of Nations is a "denial of national sov-
ereignty" neither in the intention of its founders nor in actual prac-
tice. Still less is it " nothing.'' It is, as I see it, an attempt to build
up international cooperation on the foundations of national sov-
ereignty. As such, it is not, and cannot be, an inviolable temple of
peace. But it is more than a happy fagade. It is, in my view, an
invaluable structure, both in its present admittedly limited potency
and especially—if I may be allowed a final architectural simile—as a
most necessary bridge leading from the international anarchy of the
past over into the well-ordered world government of the future.
TT . ., , „ WILLIAM E. RAPPARD.
University of Geneva.
• Op. cit., p. 227.
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